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Summary findings
International  commodity agreements (ICAs) fit uneasily  provided the impetus for resolving  some of the problems
in a world in which markets are becoming globalized and  that intervention threw up. Since the collapse of the tin
increasingly competitive. Development policy - both as  market in 1985, the belief that commodity market
preached by international agencies and as practiced by  stabilization  cannot work has undermined producers'
typically democratically elected and nonsocialist  willingness  to try to resolve difficulties  within existing  ICAs
governments in the major producing countries - and has reinforced the suspicion  of consumer governments
emphasizes productive efficiency, product quality, and  that these agreements were in no one's interests.
effective marketing.  In the current  climate, encouraging competitive
This is a long way from the ideology that gave central  markets, state interventions are seen as requiring clear
place to supply restrictions operating through central  justification in terms of market failure. The existence of
marketing boards and quota allocations.  active futures markets in all of the industries that have
In today's  less centralized,  more competitive  world,  commodity agreements makes justification along these
the winners and  losers from commodity stabilization are  lines problematic.
more evenly distributed across producing  and  But the "commodity problem"  has not disappeared,
consuming countries.  Commodity  policy is no longer a  and producers may look for other mechanisms to raise
matter of redistribution  from consumers to producers.  prices from often very low levels in industries
This institutional change has been reinforced by the  experiencing excess capacity. Developed country
widespread belief - evidenced, for example, by the  governments may be forced to decide whether they
collapse of the international tin and coffee agreements-  prefer to see markets controlled by producer cartels
that commodity market stabilization through  (where they will lack representation) or under the
international agreements cannot succeed.  auspices of international commodity agreements.
In earlier decades, the belief  that stabilization  could and
would improve the position of commodity producers
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Summary
The  International  Natural  Rubber  Agreement  is,  in  1995,  the  only  international
commodity agreement (ICA) which maintains the capability of active market intervention.  The
remaining ICAs have either lapsed or collapsed (sugar, tin) or have been replaced by agreements
whose  role  is  primarily  that  of  improving  information  (cocoa,  coffee).  The  commodity
agreement movement is effectively dead.
There  is a widespread perception that commodity agreements have "failed",  as the tin
agreement in  1985, and indeed that any attempt to control a market price will inevitably fail.
This over-simplifies the story of the breakdown of international commodity control.  The demise
of the cocoa and coffee agreements was not through tin-style collapse, or because prices were
held at too high a level.  Instead, the end of coffee control was the result of a lack of willingness
of the parties to continue playing the ICA game.  This loss of faith was partly the result of a
continuing disagreement with regard to what the ICAs were meant to achieve, with producers
more interested  in the level than the variability of prices,  and partly  to discontent  about the
division of the spoils when an agreement did manage to raise prices,  as in coffee.  But above
all,  commodity  market  control  sits  uneasily  in  a  world  in  which  all  markets  (primary,
manufacturing,  labour) are becoming increasingly competitive.
One  response  by  primary  producing  companies  and  governments  to  the  ending  of
international  commodity  control  is an  attempt  to  manage  supply unilaterally.  The  notable
attempts to  act  in this  way have  been in the coffee  and  aluminum markets.  The  evidence
suggests that these  schemes have had  relatively  small  and short-lived  effects.  However,  if
commodity prices fall back to the very low real levels experienced during  1990-93, it is likely
that schemes of this sort will move up the international agenda, particularly in those industries
where there is a history either of international control.
11.  Introduction
Taming  commodity  markets'  through  the  negotiation  of  international  commodity
agreements (ICAs) was one  of the main planks  of the so-called New International  Economic
Order (NIEO) of the nineteen seventies.  In 1995, only one ICA (natural rubber) maintains the
capability  of  active market  intervention.  The  remaining  agreements  have either  lapsed or
collapsed  (sugar,  tin) or  have been replaced by  agreements whose role  is primarily  that of
improving information  (cocoa,  coffee).  The commodity agreement  movement is effectively
dead.
Nevertheless, commodity prices remain highly variable, and are often at levels lower than
developing country producers consider just.  The consequence is that producing countries have
attempted to replace active ICA intervention through unilateral action organized by associations
of producing countries.  1993-94 saw developments of this sort  in coffee  and aluminum, the
latter a commodity which has never been regulated through an ICA.
There is a widespread perception that commodity agreements have "failed".  This was
evidently true of the tin agreement which collapsed spectacularly in 1985, but there is tendency
to draw  the conclusion that the tin collapse demonstrates that any attempt to control a market
price will inevitably fail.  For example, the Economist, commenting on the collapse of the tin
agreement, stated "The first lesson is that the road down which the tin men have clattered - that
of  artificial  control  of  a market  - leads to  ruin"  (ibid, 2  November  1985).  Similarly,  the
Economist Intelligence Unit is reported as stating that "giving long term support to prices"  is
a  "commitment  which  has  brought  about  the  collapse  of  most  international  commodity
agreements  to  date".2  Comments  of  this  sort  ignore  the  fact  that  the  tin  agreement  was
successful  in  controlling  the  tin  price  for  25  years;  they  ignore  the  success  of  OPEC  in
l  See Corea (1992).
2  Financial Times,  18 February  1992, p.3 6.
2controlling oil prices for the decade following  1974; they ignore the remarkable ability of de
Beers to control the world diamond market; and they suggest an over-simple explanation for the
more general lapse of international commodity agreements.
The objective of this paper is to examine the events which led up to the lapse or collapse
of commodity  market  control  through  international commodity agreements.  The  demise of
intervention  under  the  cocoa  and  coffee  agreements  was not  through  tin-style  collapse,  or
because prices were held at too high a level, but instead was the result of a lack of willingness
of the parties to continue playing the ICA game; and the natural rubber agreement came close
to succumbing to  the same problem.  This loss of faith was partly  the result of a continuing
disagreement  with  regard  to  what  the  ICAs  were  meant  to  achieve,  with  producers  more
interested in the level than the variability of prices, and partly to discontent about the division
of the  spoils  when an  agreement  did  manage to  raise  prices,  as  in  coffee.  But  above all,
commodity market control sits uneasily in a world in which all markets (primary, manufacturing,
labour) are becoming  increasingly competitive.  Those  ICAs which  lingered  on in this  non-
interventionist environment were undermined by the growing belief that commodity stabilization
cannot succeed and has not succeeded.
In addition,  this  paper updates the discussion in Gilbert (1987) where  I reviewed  the
structure and performance of the five ICAs which were active in the nineteen seventies and the
first  half  of  the  eighties.  That  paper  was published  shortly  after  the  collapse  of  the  tin
agreement, although the initial drafts predated those events, and indeed predicted the possibility
of collapse.  At that time, the cocoa, coffee and natural rubber  agreements were all active.
Finally, I consider the attempts by commodity producers to control commodity markets
outside the framework of commodity agreements.  To the extent that commodity agreements
failed to  be  renewed  because of consumer country  opposition, or  insistence  on stabilization
objectives which producers considered too modest, it is natural for producers to attempt to obtain
the same objectives without the consent of consumers.  The notable attempts to act in this way
have been in  the coffee  and  aluminum markets,  although  in aluminum there  was  no recent
3history of international control. 3
The structure of this paper is as follows: Section 2 reviews the history  of international
commodity agreements, the rationale of intervention through buffer stocks and export controls,
and the problems  associated with such intervention.  Section 3 considers the reasons  for the
breakdown  of  commodity  market  control  through  commodity  agreements  and  attempts  an
assessment of the performance of the agreements.  Section 4 looks at unilateral producer action
to  raise  prices,  specifically  in  the  coffee  and  aluminum  industries.  Section  5  contains
conclusions.
2.  International Commodity Agreements
2.1  Historical Review
In the postwar period, commodity market control under United Nations auspices started
in  1954 with the  International  Sugar Agreement  (ISA) and  the International  Tin Agreement
(ITA).  Subsequent  agreements  with  "economic  clauses"  were  the  International  Coffee
Agreement (ICoA, 1962), the International Cocoa Agreement (ICCA, 1972) and the International
Natural Rubber Agreement (INRA, 1980).  Table 1 summarizes the main properties of these five
agreements.4
The main concern  which motivated the ISA and  ITA was the possibility of very  low
prices, as experienced in the nineteen thirties,  attributable to a "burdensome surplus" of supply
over  demand  (Rowe,  1965;  Gilbert,  1977).  The  principal  instrument  envisaged  in  both
I  I confine the discussion to agreements between producers,  and thus exclude the de Beers
arrangement  in  which a single company has maintained a  near monopoly on diamond  sales.
Neither do I explicitly discuss the oil market,  largely because oil would require a paper in its
own right.
4 This table may be used to update the information in Tables 2, 3 and 4 of Gilbert (1987).
4agreements was supply management administered through export quotas, although the ITA also
employed a small buffer  stock for fine tuning interventions.  The ICoA was largely  modelled
on the ISA and operated entirely through supply control.  It was motivated less by any concern
for  price  stabilization than by  the hope  that it might  raise  the prices  and hence  the export
revenues  of  the coffee  producers,  then  concentrated  in  Latin  America.  Paradoxically,  the
hostility between the USA and Cuba, which caused almost insurmountable problems for the ISA,
effectively gave birth to the ICoA.
The  steady growth  of the world economy through  the fifties and  sixties gave rise  to
generally high returns  from commodity investments so that return to the conditions prevailing
in the nineteen thirties became almost unimaginable.  This change in outlook was reinforced in
the first half of the nineteen seventies by the "Limits to Growth"  concern that non-renewable
resources might be approaching exhaustion through over-exploitation (Meadows et al.,  1972),
apparently confirmed by the commodity price boom of 1973-74 followed by the tripling  of oil
prices in 1974.  The consequential transfer of spending power away from the industrial countries
led to a sharp recession on 1975, with the result that non-oil commodity prices lost their recent
gains.  (Coffee,  which  had missed out on the  1973-74 boom,  enjoyed high  prices  over this
period due  to crop  failure  in Brazil).  Developing country  commodity producers  saw in the
example of  OPEC the possibility of achieving the stable high prices  which they needed  for
development, were required for conservation, and were owed in justice.  Lacking OPEC's  power
to achieve this prices unilaterally,  they looked to the international community to provide these
prices through ICAs.  Thus was born the New International Economic Order.
Developed country governments remained ambivalent on the general  principles  of the
NIEO,  but  argued  for  a  commodity-by-commodity approach  which  would  ensure  that  any
interventions would complement rather  than substitute for market  forces.  The only  common
element of these two programmes was buffer stock price stabilization which could be justified
if market forces resulted in inadequate storage.  The official rhetoric of the ICA negotiations,
which took  place  in Geneva under  the auspices of UNCTAD,  now related to the variability
5rather than the level of prices; 5 and the buffer stock displaced export controls as the intervention
instrument.  In practice,  much of the debate concerned the level about which prices would be
stabilized, with the developing countries looking for stabilization at a "remunerative" level which
would yet be "equitable" to producers.  Resolution 93(IV) of UNCTAD sought prices stabilized
around levels which would be "remunerative and just to producers and equitable to consumers"
(UNCTAD,  1976)6.  In  a  similar  vein,  the  Brandt  Report  called  for  "the  stabilization  of
commodity prices at remunerative levels" (Independent Commission of Experts,  1980, p.158).
This studied ambivalence makes evaluation of the success of ICAs problematic.
This is the background against which the INRA came into operation in  1980, and the
(3rd)  ICCA  was  negotiated  in  1981.  The  INRA  operates  entirely  through  buffer  stock
intervention although the ICCA envisaged the possibility of supply controls once the maximum
buffer stock was held.  The ITAs also evolved so that, by the time of the 5th (1976) and 6th
(1982) agreements, the buffer stock had become at least as important as export controls in the
armoury of the International Tin Council (the ITC).  The 3rd and 4th ICCAs were also entirely
buffer  stock  based  as  had  been the  first  two ICCAs  (1972,  1975) where  the  buffer  stock
mechanism was untried - the cocoa price had remained above the intervention range throughout
both agreements.
While the decades 1955-74 saw steady growth in the world economy and high returns to
primary commodity producers, the two decades 1975-94 have exhibited lower growth and greater
turbulence in the world macroeconomy with substantially lower real commodity prices.  At the
end of 1992, many primary commodity prices were lower in real terms than at any time in the
postwar period.  In this context, the first concern of developing country primary producers was
the level rather than the variability of prices.
5  See Brown (1980) and Corea (1992) for contrasting accounts of these negotiations.
6  Reproduced in Brown (1980, p.274) and Correa (1992, p.206)
6Prices have recovered substantially since mid 1993, led by agricultural commodities with
metals following in 1994.  However, there are already signs that this mini-boom may be fading
out,  and the important issue is the level to which prices drop back once demand growth and
speculative interest abate.  Only then will it be possible to judge the extent to which the low real
prices of the late eighties and early nineties were a cyclical phenomenon and the extent to which
there  has  been a  permanent  shift  in  the terms  of  trade  of  primary  commodities  relative  to
manufactures.
In  what  follows  I try  to  isolate the  factors which  were  responsible  for  the  lapse or
collapse of market intervention through ICAs.  Buffer stock agreements raise somewhat different
issues from those important in export control agreements, and I discuss these first in section 2.2.
Section 2.3 covers export control agreements.  Then, in section 3 I look in detail at the precise
sequence of events in the five active agreements.  Section 4 considers the unilateral  producer
control movements that have succeeded some commodity agreements, and section  5 contains
conclusions.
2.2  Buffer Stock Stabilization
Three  ICAs (the ICCA,  INRA and ITA) have relied wholly or partly on buffer  stock
intervention.  As  implied above,  the buffer  stock  is a candidate  instrument  for  reducing  or
eliminating price fluctuations about a known long run level.
Buffer  stock  stabilization rests  on  an  implicit  premise  that private  sector  storage  is
inadequate.  This may be a valid assumption in the absence of efficient futures markets since
individual  risk  aversion  will  in  general  result  in  investments  (here  investment  in  storage)
requiring inappropriately large risk premia (Arrow and Lind, 1970).  However, futures markets
allow  separation  of  the  speculative  and  storage  decisions with  the result  that  stockholding
becomes near riskless and so should be little affected by individual risk aversion.7 In that case,
7  Danthine (1978) and Holthausen (1979).  See also Anderson and Gilbert (1992).
7public sector storage should be governed by the same criteria as private  sector storage, and it
is simply invalid to claim that the high volatility that these markets exhibit justifies public sector
storage.  In fact, all three commodities for which there have been active buffer stock agreements
are traded on futures markets.  The implication is that funds invested in commodity buffer stocks
could have earned  higher returns  in other activities.  This is clearly  the case  in tin,  where
member contributions were entirely lost, but applies also to cocoa and natural rubber.
At the practical  level, buffer stock stabilization faces two major problems:
a)  the long  run price  level about which stabilization should take place may change over
time,  requiring updating of the stabilization range;  and
b)  even if the stabilization range is appropriately defined,  the intervention authority may
lack the resources to keep the price within the range.
The long run sustainable price may change over time because of changes in production
costs, or of consumer tastes.  Problems associated with updating of price support ranges became
central  in the three  buffer  stock ICAs.  In the two decades to  1973, buoyant  real prices  in
conjunction with low inflation in the developed countries implied that periodic upward revision
of ranges was required.  This seldom proved controversial since, with actual prices generally
above the stabilization range,  consumer country governments did  not  see range  revisions  as
likely to raise realised prices.  By contrast, over the two decades from 1975, falling real prices
and (since 1981) low inflation have implied that actual prices have tended to be at the bottom
of the price range in buffer  stock agreements.  The ITA contained no mechanism for revision
of the price support range,  and this range also suffered from an implicit dollar link.8 The lack
of updating procedures was an important factor in the collapse of the ITA.
8  From  1972, the ITA price  support range was denominated  in terms of the Malaysian
dollar which was closely linked to the US dollar during the nineteen eighties.
8By contrast, if the stabilization range adjusts so rapidly that it simply tracks the market
price, the agreement will not stabilize prices to any useful extent.  Specifically, if an agreement
stabilization range  is revised down to  a  sufficiently large  extent  in relation  to  weak  market
conditions, producing countries will cease to perceive any interest in the so-called stabilization
exercise.  The INRA does  include provisions for periodic revision of the support range,  but
these revisions  have proved  unpopular with  producing governments since with  weak prices,
downward revision has implied a fall in actual prices.  Disputes over downward revision of the
price  support ranges were  important in generating disenchantment in the 2nd INRA,  and also
in the 4th ICCA.
The second problem is that buffer stock stabilization can be expensive.  This is obvious
if "stabilization" is around a price in excess of the long run market clearing level, but it will also
be true  in a  "neutral"  scheme in which the correct  long run price  level has been identified.
Theoretical models suggest that commodity price cycles will exhibit long flat bottoms punctuated
by occasional sharp peaks (Williams and Wright,  1991; Deaton and Laroque,  1992).  This view
implies that buffer stock stabilization will be an expensive instrument for dealing with low prices
since stocks will need to be held over a long period, but will also be ineffective at the peaks,
which arise from  stockouts.  These difficulties are exacerbated  by the fact that public sector
storage displaces private stocks, so that the intervention authority finds itself carrying much or
all of the stock that the private sector would have held in the absence of intervention (Miranda
and Helmberger,  1988).  Townsend (1977) has shown that any neutral price-fixing scheme will
eventually exhaust available resources.  It is clear that the less finance an intervention authority
has available, the earlier this likely exhaustion date.  Lack of finance severely handicapped the
ICCA and was a major cause of the collapse of the ITA.
In practice,  the updating  and  finance difficulties become  mutually entangled.  Long
investment lead times allow the possibility that metals and tree crop commodities can experience
acute excess or (more rarely) under-capacity for sufficiently long periods  of time as to make
buffer stock stabilization about the supposed long run price infeasible.  This factor was important
for both the ICCA, as the result of severe excess capacity during the nineteen eighties,  and in
9the ITA, where exhaustion of Malaysian alluvial deposits had resulted in a sustained period of
under-capacity in the seventies.  If it is only feasible to stabilize prices around a medium term
rather than a long term level, the lower the resources available for stabilization, the greater the
need  for  flexible updating  procedures.  The  ITA  broke  down  because  the  agreement  was
inadequately financed, was attempting to stabilize at too high a level and was carrying the entire
world surplus.  The 3rd and 4th ICCAs were both poorly financed and committed to stabilizing
the price at too high a level.  The INRA has been more successful, but could not reverse a trend
decline in real prices and,  as price support levels have fallen,  has come to be seen as of only
marginal value to producers.
2.3  Stabilization using Export Controls
Three ICAs (the ICoA, the ISA and the ITA) have relied wholly or partially  on export
controls.  Export controls are better seen as an instrument for raising prices from unsustainably
low levels than for stabilizing prices.  This is because effective controls can compel reductions
in available supply in the face of low prices, but can seldom compel producers to increase supply
in the face of high prices.  This asymmetry arises from the fact that producers  in a competitive
market are collectively better off from reducing exports from the levels which maximize profits
on an individualistic basis, even if individually they are worse off.9 However, an  increase in
exports from the individualistic maximization level reduces profits individually and collectively.
The tendency for metals and tree crop commodities to experience long periods during
which prices are beneath long run average costs arises out of the interaction of long investment
lead times and stockholding.  If price or consumption growth expectations are over-optimistic,
these industries can find themselves with significant over-capacity.  But because capital costs
formn a  large  component  of  total  costs,  variables  costs  will  be  covered  even  with  prices
9  In  terms  of  simple  game  theory,  this  is  the move  from  the non-cooperative  to  the
cooperative solution in the prisoners'  dilemma game - see e.g.  Tirole (1988, pp.258-60).
10significantly beneath long run average costs.  Only the least efficient plants (or plantations) will
find it worthwhile ceasing production.  But with production remaining above consumption, the
excess must be added to stock, and the resulting stock overhang will keep prices low even after
capacity comes back into line with demand.  (In the converse case of under capacity arising from
insufficiently  optimistic  expectations,  stocks are  low and  so prices  can  fall back  once  new
capacity becomes available).
Export controls are a response to the "burdensome surplus"  situations arising from the
interactions of the investment and stock components of the commodity cycle.  They face three
major problems:
a)  they rely on a comprehensive compliance both by actual and potential producers;
b)  they may introduce distortions; and
c)  the potential benefits may be appropriated through or dissipated in rent-seeking activities.
Compliance is always a problem in any cartel-like arrangement.  Each producer benefits
from  the price  rise  in resulting from  other producers'  supply restrictions,  but  would benefit
himself by maintaining or even increasing his own production level (since price  is now above
marginal cost).  Every producer therefore  has an incentive to renege but is aware that obvious
violations of the agreement will encourage others to follow.  Because these agreements typically
do not redistribute profits between members (i.e. they do not permit "side payments"),  low cost
producers, who might be inclined to expand even at low price levels, feel the weakest attachment
and  it is therefore  essential that  the arrangements  should be  such that they  do not  look  for
opportunities to withdraw.  Potential producers,  or producers who were too small to be included
in the scheme, are unrestricted.  Supply restrictions therefore tend to encourage both production
by non-members and non-compliance by members.  This was a  serious problem in tin where
Brazil,  a non-member of the ITA, found it profitable to substantially expand production under
the umbrella of ITC export controls.  Current discussions on cocoa market control are faltering
11in  part because  of  reluctance  by  Indonesia,  a  low cost  producer,  to  restrict  its  expansion.
However,  its  proponents  would  argue  that  the  ICoA  managed  to  maintain  comprehensive
compliance over more than two decades.
The allocation of export quotas has the potential to distort both the production structure
of the industry,  since low cost member producers are unable to expand at the expense of high
cost producers,  and also the consumption structure,  if more than one grade of the commodity
is produced.  Grade distortion was a major problem in the ICoAs, where consumer preferences
moved during the eighties towards high quality mild arabica coffees at the expense of robustas
and unwashed arabicas.  The ICoA's  historic quota allocations generated a significant premium
for mild arabicas,  while at the same time the agreement allowed production in excess of quota
of these premium coffees to be sold at substantial discounts in non-member consuming countries
(largely in eastern Europe and south-east Asia) - see Bohman and Jarvis (1990).
As primary prices generally declined in real terms during the nineteen eighties, the price
raising features of the export control agreements became more transparent than previously, but
at the same time, growing evidence that, at least in the case of coffee, quota allocations in many
instances generated  rent-seeking,  cast doubt on whether the coffee growers themselves  were
always beneficiaries  of these prices.  The extent and effects of rent seeking behaviour of this
form in the Indonesian coffee sector has been well documented by Bohman et al. (1993).  The
result of such activities  is that the coffee producers  have come to  see little direct  benefit to
themselves from the control agreement.  The extent to which the benefits from higher prices are
diverted to others or simply dissipated in wasteful activities is difficult to gauge.
Rent seeking and the distortion of markets are problems of market efficiency.  The extent
of inefficiency introduced by resort to export controls will increase the longer they are in effect.
Increasingly, therefore, the international community has come to see attempts to formalize export
control arrangements  into long term agreements as misguided.  It is less clear,  however,  that
there  may not be benefit from permitting arrangements of this sort  as short term emergency
arrangements.
123.  Breakdown
3.1  The International  Sugar Agreements
The precise  events which  led to the lapse or breakdown of the five agreements under
consideration were  complicated.  The economic provisions  of the 2nd sugar agreement  were
suspended  in  1962 when  Cuba,  denied access to  the  US  market,  sought  a  very  substantial
increase in quota which other producers were unwilling to concede.  The agreement lapsed in
1963.  The 4th (1978) ISA was a victim both of poor drafting and of the European Union's  (EU)
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) which saw the EU move from being a net importer of sugar
to become the single largest net exporter in the world.'°  ISA export controls related to a  set
of  "basic export  tonnages",  but  these were  calculated in such a  way as to  allow substantial
increases in member country exports with the result that International Sugar Organization (ISO)
controls had very little potential to affect prices.  But in any case, the EU had declined to join
the 4th ISA  arguing disingenuously for a buffer  stock agreement.  The USA  also supported
domestic  sugar  production,  and  limited imports with  a  tough  quota  regime.  The  ISO was
therefore powerless to reverse a decline in prices which took the real sugar price to a postwar
low  in  1985.  When  the  4th  ISA,  extended  to  the  end  of  1984,  finally  terminated,  the
arrangements which replaced it did not contain market intervention clauses. 1"
3.2  The International Tin Agreements
It was the dramatic collapse of the 6th tin agreement on United Nations Day (24 October)
1985 which, more than any other single event, persuaded the developed world that commodity
price stabilization is infeasible.  The history of tin price stabilization under  the first five ITAs
10  Strictly  the  European  Community  at  that  time.  However,  I  adopt  the  current
nomenclature throughout.
This paragraph  summarizes a longer account in Gilbert (1987).
13was generally successful.  The agreement floor had only been penetrated on a single occasion,
and then only briefly.  The International Tin Council (ITC) had been less successful at holding
the price beneath the ceiling, particularly during the seventies when the stabilization range tended
to chase after the price, but nevertheless industry generally regarded the exercise as worthwhile.
The seeds of the problems which were to be experienced during the 6th ITA were sown
in the final year  (1981) of the 5th ITA when the ITC buffer  stock accumulated a very  large
holding in the face of the collapse in demand as developed country governments attempted to
grapple with the inflationary potential of the second oil price rise.  This stock was inherited by
the ITC under the 6th ITA, but in part because the Reagan administration declined to renew US
membership,  the ITC  lacked  sufficient finance to  hold the stock.  Tough export  restrictions
implied  that  the  buffer  stock  holding  did  not  increase  significantly  during  the  6th  ITA.
However,  becuase the ITC had insufficient funds to purchase more than a small fraction of the
market overhang outright, and because of ITA limits on the overall level of holdings, the buffer
stock  manager  (BSM) was  forced into a  number  of complicated  forward  market  and  other
transactions which, while they ensured that the ITC's  holdings (in the sense of the tin which it
legally owned) were within the ITA limits, resulted in an exposure substantially in excess of the
ITC's  assets.  In effect,  the ITC paid the London metal trade to hold the stock on its behalf
while offering full insurance against any price fall.  These devices worked well for the ITC until
1985 as the implicit link of the stabilization range to the soaring US dollar implied rising sterling
prices and hence gains on the ITC's London forward market positions (denominated in sterling).
However,  as the  dollar  fell  from  February  1985,  the ITC  started  to  make  losses on  these
positions, and with no new funds forthcoming, became insolvent on 23 October.  These events
are summarized in Anderson and Gilbert (1988).
Forward  (futures) market operations were not the cause of the ITA collapse.  Rather,
ability to trade on the futures market was the factor which allowed the ITC to continue to hold
the tin price from 1981 through 1985 despite an almost complete lack of funds.  Instead, the 6th
ITA collapsed because it was insufficiently financed, thereby forcing the tin BSM into covert
and  dubiously  legal  forward  transactions.  Anderson and  Gilbert  (1988) estimate  that these
14activities prolonged the life of the agreement  by perhaps six months.  They also resulted in
substantial  losses to London  metals traders, 12 and, for a time, called into question the integrity
of the London Metal Exchange (the LME), the major international  market for non-ferrous
metals.
Even if the 6th ITA had been adequately  financed  and the BSM  had confined  himself to
spot market support, the agreement  would  have run into much more serious  problems  than those
experienced  by the first five ITAs. Figure 1 shows  the ti;. price more than doubling relative  to
the World Bank metals and minerals  prices index during the latter half of the seventies." 3 This
rise in prices was the result of declining  tin content in the increasingly  exhausted Malaysian
alluvial deposits, Malaysia being the largest  tin producer at that time.  During this period, the
price was generally above the stabilization  range and this resulted in the ITA support range
chasing the market price upwards.  The consequence  was that when metals prices peaked in
1980, the ITC was committed  to a higher range than would ever have been contemplated  five
years earlier.  At the same time, the rapid expansion  of low cost tin production in Brazil (not
a member of the ITA) combined with the capture of the beverages  can market by aluminum
resulted in a fall in the sustainable  tin price with the consequence  that the nominal dollar tin
price is now little different from that in the mid nineteen seventies, prior to the major rise in
prices.  So although  the immediate  cause of the breakdown  of the 6th ITA was insolvency  due
to futures market operations, the fundamental  causes were lack of finance and a change in
underlying  market fundamentals.
12  Kestenbaum  (1991) chronicles  their battle for compensation.
13  Sources: tin price - World  Bureau  of Metal Statistics, World Metal  Statistics  (Ware,
Herts.,  various issues); metal and minerals index - Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit,
International  Trade Division (Washington  D.C.).
153.3  The International Cocoa Agreements
As in sugar and tin, the four cocoa agreements also struggled against a background of
major  supply  problems.  The  price  during  the  first  two  ICCAs  (1972-79)  was  always
substantially above the ceiling of the support range as the result both of  low rainfall  in west
Africa, reducing yields, and maladministration by the military government of Ghana (then the
largest producer).  The high prices in 1976-79 not only made a mockery of the 2nd ICCA but
also indirectly  undermined the 3rd ICCA by  suggesting a stabilization range which,  ex post,
appears to have been too high, and by stimulating excessive planting in the C6te d'Ivoire,  which
displaced  Ghana as  the  largest producer,  and also  in  Brazil,  Indonesia  and  Malaysia.  The
situation in the 3rd and 4th ICCAs was therefore the reverse of that in the earlier agreements,
with the price in general beneath the ICCA stabilization range (see Figure 2).'4
The  3rd  ICCA,  which  was chronically  under-financed  (neither the  largest  producing
country,  the  C6te  d'Ivoire,  nor  the  largest  consuming  country,  the  USA,  were  members)
exhausted  its entire  financial resources  within three  months of the  start of the agreement  in
purchasing 100,000 tons of cocoa.  The 4th ICCA limited the size of the buffer stock to 250,000
tons, the equivalent of around six weeks consumption.  Total stocks at the end of the 1986-87
crop year were estimated as 650,000 tons, and these rose to  1,376,000 tons by the end of the
1991-92 crop  year.  But because the ICCO inherited 100,000 tons from the 3rd agreement,  it
was only able to accumulate a maximum of a further 150,000 tons.  Against this background,
it was clearly unrealistic  to expect the agreement to have any significant effect on  the cocoa
price.  Although the 4th ICCA made provision for an increase in the maximum allowable size
of the buffer stock to 350,000 tons, this provision was never invoked.
The 3rd and 4th ICCAs specify floor and ceiling prices, but the effective price range is
defined by the gap  between the lower  intervention "must buy" price  (the LIP) and the upper
"4  Source: International Cocoa Organization, Quarterly Bulletin of Cocoa Statistics, (ICCO,
London),  various issues.
16intervention "must sell"  price  (the UIP).  The 4th ICCA also defines an inner band between
"may buy" and  "may sell" prices.  Figure 2 graphs the ICCO indicator price (an average  of
London and New York prices) is US ¢/lb, together with the LIB and UIB prices specified in the
3rd and 4th ICCAs.  The rise  in the US dollar during the course of the 3rd ICCA depressed
dollar cocoa prices independently of any movement in the supply-demand balance, and, with the
ICCO's  finances  exhausted,  the  price  fell  beneath  the specified  range.  To  overcome  this
exchange rate problem, the 4th ICCA specified the stabilization range in SDR terms, and for this
reason the range graphed in Figure 2 varies with the dollar-SDR exchange rate.  The agreement
specifies semi-automatic downward revision of the LIP and UIP after purchase of 75,000 tons
of cocoa,  and again if a further 75,000 tons was purchased.  Here,  semi-automatic means that
the ICCO Council has the opportunity to agree to a revision, but, in the absence of agreement,
a downward revision of specified size is imposed.
The 4th agreement came into force in October 1987 and the ICCO buffer  stock rapidly
accumulated 150,000 tons of cocoa bringing it to its maximum permitted level of 250,000 tons.
On a precise interpretation of the agreement, this should have triggered two downward revisions
of the price  range.  The first downward revision took place in January  1988 (although this is
obscured in Figure 2 by a contemporaneous appreciation of the dollar).  However,  the second
revision was resisted by the producing member countries on the argument that, since the buffer
stock was now at its maximum size, there was nothing to be gained  from further downward
revision of the LIP.  This ignores the fact that downward revision would also have affected the
UIP.  This disagreement, together with a lack of finance (many countries were in arrears with
respect to their contributions) which effectively prevented increase in the allowable buffer stock
size, resulted in suspension of the economic clauses of the ICCA in February  1988.
The 4th ICCA contained provisions on withholding which were designed to augment the
buffer  stock  facility.  In  the event that  the maximum buffer  stock  was  attained,  producing
countries would withhold cocoa from the market in domestic stockpiles.  The ICCO would pay
for the storage costs of this cocoa, but would not be required to purchase it.  This was seen as
a less expensive way of keeping the market in balance than the accumulation of a large buffer
17stock.  However, with the economic clauses of the ICCA suspended, these provisions were never
activated and the ICCA has simply turned over its stock.  In any case, the effect of domestic
stockpiles  is  doubtful given the  high  costs  of  storage  and  the absence  of  adequate  storage
facilities for cocoa in many of the producing countries.
The 4th ICCA was extended in this dormant form to September  1993. The buffer stock
inherited from the 4th ICCA are to be liquidated over a four year period from  1 October 1993.
The 5th ICCA, which came into effect in October 1993, is discussed below in section 4.4.
3.4  The International Coffee Agreements
The International Coffee Agreement is both the most important and the most controversial
of the ICAs which has remained in operation over the past decade.  The agreement is important
because more developing countries are dependent on coffee exports than on any other single non-
oil primary  commodity;  it is controversial because,  since it operated entirely  through export
controls,  it laid itself open to the charge of being an  internationally sanctioned cartel  whose
objectives were primarily raising rather than stabilizing the coffee price.  Palm and Vogelvang
(1991,  p.1 19),  for  example,  conclude  "The  [ICoA] appears  to  be  favorable  to  producing
countries who earn more revenues from their exports because they are smaller in quantity but
sold at a higher price" - see also Herrmann (1988).  Importantly, it was also seen as distorting
the operation of the market - see Bohman and Jarvis (1990).
The ICoAs operated through quotas on coffee exports which were triggered  if a 15 day
moving average of the ICO composite indicator price (CIP), which is an average of dollar other
mild and  robusta  prices,  fell below a designated trigger  (134.5  C/lb from  1981) and  further
increased if this moving average fell beneath two further triggers (120 C/lb and 115 C/lb).  The
quotas were reduced if the average broke through two upper triggers (140 C/lb and 145 C/lb) and
suspended if the average exceeded a final trigger (150 C/lb) for a 30 day period.  Although the
ICoAs do not contain an explicit price stabilization range, the gap between the suspension trigger
and the lower quota increase trigger implicitly defines a target range (115-150 ¢/lb from  1981).
18Figure 3 graphs the actual CIP and this implicit range over the period of the 3rd and 4th
ICoAs,  and also the intervention range defined in the September 1993 retention scheme - see
section 3.2.'5  The 3rd ICoA had come into operation during  the 1975-79 price boom.  The
consuming country members  were  initially reluctant to  see  the reintroduction  of  quotas,  but
eventually  agreed  in  September  1980 on the understanding  that a  group  of  Latin  American
producers  desisted from attempts to raise the price outside the scope of the ICoA.  Helped by
frost in Brazil in 1981, the ICO quotas generally managed to achieve stable prices within the
implicit ICoA range.  Drought conditions in Brazil during  1985-86 coffee year resulted in the
suspension  of  controls  in  February  1986,  to  be  reintroduced  the following  year  as  supply
recovered  and prices fell back again.  "Independence Day" for coffee was 4 July  1989 when
quotas  were again suspended despite the fact that the CIP had not reached any of the trigger
levels for quota reduction.
The technical reason for the July 1989 suspension of the ICoA quotas was that, with the
4th agreement due to end on 30 September, there appeared to be no basis for a new agreement
with economic clauses.  A number of different factors combined to generate dissatisfaction with
the  way that the ICoAs  had  operated,  but  there was no consensus as to  how this  should be
changed.  On the consumers'  side, dissatisfaction related to the market distortions perceived to
be  generated by the ICoA.  Consumer tastes have shifted over  time towards the high  quality
arabica beans  produced by the Colombian  "milds" (Colombia,  Kenya,  Tanzania)  and  "other
milds"  (mainly central American) groups of producers,  but the ICO quota allocation tended to
generate  a  higher  premium  for this  type of coffee  over the prices  of robustas  (produced  in
Brazil,  Indonesia and Africa) and unwashed arabicas (produced in Brazil).  Dramatic evidence
for this was provided by the February  1986 suspension of quotas: over the following year,  the
premium of mild arabicas over robustas fell from 42% to just 6% (March  1987 compared with
March  1986).  But consuming countries were also irritated by the fact that the ICoAs permitted
unlimited exports to non-member consuming countries at free market prices which, particularly
"  Source: International Coffee Organization, Monthly Report on Prices, (ICO,  London),
various issues.
19in the case of high quality arabicas, were often at a considerable discount (estimated at 30-50%)
to  ICO  prices.  It  was subsequently  agreed that  any  new agreement  would  use  "universal
quotas'".
On the producers'  side, despite the recognition that the ICoAs had generally achieved a
combination of high and stable prices, there was disagreement over the division of the spoils.
The "other milds"  group of producers perceived the existing ICoAs as acting primarily for the
benefit of Brazil,  which produces  robustas and the lower quality unwashed arabicas,  and the
African robusta producers.  Rotemberg and Saloner (1989) have emphasized the role that stocks
can play  in  strategic behaviour  between cartel  members.  This  possibility  was dramatically
illustrated  by the (not  altogether successful) attempt by  Saudi Arabia  to discipline  the other
OPEC members in  1986, and although this threat was never implemented in the ICoA,  in the
early agreements Brazil had the capability of doing this.  However, as the result of depletion of
her  stock  levels after the  1975 frost and the  1985-86 drought,  Brazil's  dominant  position as
coffee stockholder was seriously weakened by the late eighties,  This is illustrated in Figure  4
which graphs Brazil's share of total gross producer stocks at the October start of the coffee years
1967-92.16 Perceiving  this diminution of Brazil's  implied threat to disrupt  the coffee market
if her quota were not maintained, the other milds group were only prepared  to agree to a 5th
ICoA if the quota allocation were reallocated in their favor.
Practice under the first four ICoAs was that the allocation of quotas was the responsibility
of  the Council  of  the  ICoA,  which  was required  to  take  into account  a  number  of  factors
including the market position.  In practice,  the quota allocation had only moved marginally in
favor of the other milds producers during the 4th ICoA - the total quota for Colombian and other
milds stood at 44.3 % when quotas were suspended in July  1989 against 43.1 % nine months
earlier as the result of a redistribution of part of the Angolan quota.  This redistribution,  which
also increased  the Brazilian quota, did little to address the perceived pro-Brazilian bias  in the
16  Source: International  Coffee Organization, Supply of  Coffee,  (ICO, London),  various
issues.
20quota allocations, and indeed the total milds quota remained substantially lower than the 47.7%
obtained  in  1980-81  in  the  aftermath  of  the  Brazilian  frost.  The  other  milds  producers,
supported by the USA, but opposed by Brazil, the African robusta producers and the EU, argued
for quota reallocation to be embodied in any new agreement.
The determination of the "other milds" producers to hold out for a quota redistribution
may have been reinforced by a World Bank study circulating around this time which argued that,
although the 3rd and 4th ICoAs significantly stabilized both prices and producer revenues, they
typically did not give rise to higher revenues for countries other than Brazil and Colombia.  and
that  aggregate revenues  would recover  from  the ending of  controls after  less than a  decade
(Akiyama and Varangis,  1989, 1990).'7  In fact, prices fell by 40% in the two years following
the suspension of  quotas (coffee year  1990-91 compared  with  1987-88, the last full year  of
control), and remained at around that level for four years.  Furthermore,  the fall in mild arabica
prices was not dramatically less than that in robusta prices (35% and 48% respectively over the
same period).
The situation  was complicated by the lack of consensus in Brazil  in  favor of  market
intervention.  The Brazilian industry was controlled by the Instituto Brasileiro do Cafe (the IBC),
and  it was widely considered within Brazil that it was the  IBC itself,  rather  than the coffee
growers,  which  was  the  principal  beneficiary  of  coffee  stabilization.  Indeed,  the  coffee
exporters tended to favor a free market,  while the roasters  (Brazil is the second largest coffee
consuming country) were at best ambivalent.  Collor became President in April 1990, and one
of his first moves was to abolish the IBC.  A major difficulty in attempting to negotiate a new
ICoA was that for much of 1990-91 Brazil had no clear coffee policy.  Brazil had always been
17  These  results  are  a  consequence  of  export  quotas  being  met  in  part  by  increased
stockholding, which has the effect of subsequently reducing prices, together with the tendency
for producers other than Brazil and Colombia to profitably dispose of excess production on non-
quota  markets.  The results  differ  from  those  reported  by  Herrmann  (1988) and  Palm and
Vogelvang (1991) who saw producers in general as benefiting from the ICoA controls.  Akiyama
and Varangis (1989) is dated February  1989 and was in circulation by the summer of 1989.
21central to the operation of the ICoAs.  Consumer governments had agreed to the reintroduction
of controls under the 3rd ICoA in September 1980 when Brazil had demonstrated that,  in the
absence of an agreement, it would attempt to enforce high prices by coordination of a producers
organization (Productores de Cafe S.A.,  PANCAFE); and Brazil had maintained its large share
of quotas despite a declining share of world production through the implied threat of flooding
the market  from its stockpile.  Now that Brazil lacked the will to enforce an agreement on the
other producing countries, the ICoA broke up.
Coffee market control lapsed, therefore,  because there was no clear consensus  for its
continuation.  It seems likely that the ICoA could have been saved in 1989 by a 4% increase in
the total other milds quota to 48%, a move which had US support.  It is probable that, two years
later,  all producers  would have accepted a new agreement on this basis but by  this time the
consumers,  who could now see both  the price and the market distortion consequences of the
ICoAs,  were  no longer interested  in playing ball.  The ICoAs  have been successful  both  in
raising and perhaps also in stabilizing prices, but at a cost.  For consumers,  the cost was grade
distortion, limiting the availability of high quality arabicas, and market distortion, whereby these
same coffees were sold at much lower prices in non-member countries.  For producers,  the cost
was a freezing of the historic distribution of production.  Much of the benefit of high prices may
have been lost either  to governments (through export taxes) or to third parties  (through  rent
seeking).  In the end, there was insufficient support in either producing or consuming countries
for a continuation of the previous form of agreement despite a general view  in the producing
countries that some form of agreement would be desirable.
Negotiations for a new ICoA eventually took place in 1993, and the 5th ICoA came into
effect in October 1994.  Despite the fact that the agreement does not contain any provisions for
direct market intervention, congressional opposition prevented the US from joining.  Indeed, the
realization that the US Congress might not ratify a further agreement with "economic clauses"
even if the grade  and non-member distortions had been solved,  and the appreciation  that an
export control agreement could not be successful without US membership, may have diminished
the incentives to try to resolve these issues.  Subsequent developments in the coffee market are
22discussed in section 4.2.
3.5  The International  Natural Rubber Agreement
The rubber agreement is the only ICA which still gives rise to active market intervention.
The structure of the INRA is quite complicated - see Table 1.  Intervention is defined in terms
of a Daily Market Indicator Price (DMIP) which is an average of the Kuala Lumpur, London,
New York  and  Singapore cash  prices,  all converted  to be  f.o.b.  Malaysia  in an  average  of
Malaysian and Singapore C/kg  (MS C/kg).  The INRA denominates a floor and ceiling which
will have been unchanged from the start of the first INRA in October 1980 until the third INRA
comes into force in 1996.  The effective floor and ceiling are, however,  the lower and upper
trigger  action  prices  (the  LTAP  and  the  UTAP)  where  the  International  Natural  Rubber
Organization (INRO) BSM is required respectively to buy and sell.  Within this range are the
lower and upper intervention prices (the LIP and UIP) which determine the prices at which the
BSM  may  respectively  buy  and  sell.  If  the  price  is between  the  LIP  and  the  UIP  he  is
constrained to inactivity.  The INRAs have been successful in the same terms as the first five
ITAs in that the price has generally remained above both the INRA floor  and the LTIP - see
Figure 5.18  However, as in the ITA, the INRO was unable to contain the price beneath either
the ceiling or the UTAP during the AIDS-inspired latex boom of 1987-88 when its buffer stock
became exhausted.  From 1989 until mid-1994 the rubber price was close to or within the lower
intervention range.
The INRA makes provision for automatic revision of the reference price, and hence also
the UTAP,  UIP,  LIP  and  LTAP which  are defined  symmetrically around  this  price,  if the
average DMIP is above the UIP or below the LIP over a six month period (also if buffer  stock
sales or purchases exceed a specified amount over a six month period).  The reference price was
18  Source: International Rubber Study Group, Rubber Statistical Bulletin (IRSG, Wembley),
various issues.
23revised up in April  1989 towards the end of the 1987-89 boom, only to be revised down again
in  July  1990.  A further  downward  revision was  triggered  in November  1992.  However,
producing countries disputed this requirement which depended on the use of an unrounded rather
than a rounded price in comparing a the DMIP average of prices with the reference price (the
six month average was 175.95 MS C/kg against the LIP of 176 MS c/kg).  The actual agreement
is silent on the matter of rounding, but it had previously been INRO practice to report and make
decisions on the basis of average prices calculated to two decimal places.  In any event,  the
producers declined to agree to the revision, and there was no official stabilization range until
February  1994.  The INRA  was in limbo from November 1992 in that the BSM had  no clear
criteria by which to operate.  However, when in September 1993 the DMIP fell beneath the "as
if" downward revised LTAP, the BSM again felt free to buy, presumably because the DMIP was
now beneath the LTAP on both the revised and the unrevised basis.  After protracted wrangling,
the support range was finally retrospectively adjusted downwards from February  1994.
This disagreement was symbolic of a deeper problem - the producer countries felt that
stabilization of the price at the low levels prevailing in 1992-93 offered them little advantage.
Many  took  the  view  that  it  would  be  preferable  to  initiate  export  controls  through  their
producers'  organization (the Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries, ANRPC) rather
than to continue  to tie up funds in the INRO." 9 Negotiations for the third INRA proceeded
laboriously through  1993 and 1994 necessitating two extensions of the second INRA to the end
of  1995.  With  no further extension possible, agreement  was eventually reached in February
1995 for a third agreement which will come into effect in 1996.  The price range constituted the
major difficulty in renegotiation, with producers seeking some restoration of the cuts triggered
during  the second INRA  and consumers resisting this.  The prolonged dispute through  1993
exacerbated  these tensions.  Compromise was facilitated by the rally in rubber  prices during
1994, even despite the sale of the accumulated buffer stock.  The rubber price climbed steadily
1  Malaysian primary  industries minister Dr. Lim Kheng Yaik was quoted as saying "We
want INRA but  not at any cost.  Producers  must protect  themselves.  They should not allow
themselves to be trampled on by the rich and powerful consuming nations."  (Financial Times,
16 May 1993).
24through  1994 with  the  result  that  in  the  final  quarter  of  the year  it was  above  the  INRO
stabilization range - see Figure 5 - and indeed even above the notional ceiling price of 270 MS
c/kg.  The compromise raised the symbolic floor price but left the effective stabilization range
unchanged but  subject to review within six months of the new agreement coming  into force.
The most important outstanding issue is whether the United States'  administration will be able
to  persuade Congress to ratify a new INRA.  If they do ratify,  this will be the only ICA of
which the USA is a member.
The INRA has survived essentially by being relatively innocuous.  The determination of
consuming country members of the agreement to ensure that the INRA does not distort prices
has resulted in the stabilization range being revised down to a sufficiently large extent that the
INRO has been left with little opportunity to  stabilize prices.  Indeed,  at least since 1985 the
rubber price history graphed in Figure 5 is almost a paradigm of the flat-bottomed sharp-peaked
cycles generated by private  sector storage in the Williams and Wight (1991) and Deaton and
Laroque (1992) models and allows little residual role for the INRO.
3.6  ICA Performance
There has always been disagreement about the extent to which ICAs have either stabilized
or raised prices.  Evaluations have typically relied on counterfactual simulation of econometric
models  - see  for  example  Palm  and  Vogelvang  (1988)  and  Vogelvang  (1988)  on  coffee.
However, exercises of this sort are inevitably qualified by worries over the extent to which the
models provide adequate descriptions of producer and consumer behaviour.  Here I experiment
with the simpler alternative of event study methodology, which is both a cruder and less formal
method than econometric evaluation.
25In Table 2 I give price averages for cocoa, coffee, sugar and tin annually from the time
of the cessation of intervention. 20 In each case the prices are measured relative the World Bank
33 Commodity Index, over the period from one year before the lapse (cocoa, coffee, sugar) or
collapse  (tin) of the economic clauses of the agreement to the present.  The horizontal  axis
measures the time,  in years,  since the breakdown  of support (and therefore  corresponds  to a
different  date for  each of the four  commodities).  In each case,  the end of  the agreement  is
associated  with  prices  of  around  40%  lower  than  during  the  final year  of  the  agreement.
Furthermore,  these lower prices are seen to persist for at least four years.  Taken at face value,
this exercise suggests that the ICAs may have raised prices quite substantially.
Nevertheless, even where it is possible to attribute these lower prices to the ending of
the ICA, it would be wrong to draw the conclusion that the ICA resulted in a price premium of
this order.  The four commodities considered in Table 2 form two pairs.  In the case of cocoa
and sugar  it is arguable  that the agreements lapsed because the extent of  over-supply  in  the
market implied that it was no longer possible to attempt to stabilize prices at historic levels.  In
these cases, the lower post-ICA prices are the evidence of this over-supply and were not caused
by the collapse of the relevant agreement.  Neither is it possible to argue that in either case was
this over-supply due to the operation of the ICA.  In coffee and tin, by contrast, the lower post-
ICA prices are attributable to the collapse of stabilization, and result largely from the release of
stocks accumulated during the stabilization period.  In both cases it seems likely that stabilization
did result in prices above long run production costs, but the release in stocks will have depressed
the price to beneath this level.  Over time,  one would expect the price to rise towards its long
run as stocks run down.  This has happened to some extent, but in coffee the process has been
interrupted  by the developments I will discuss in section 4.2,  and in tin demand growth  has
failed to reach expectations.
20  Sources: Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit, International Trade Division, World Bank
(Washington D.C.).  The date for lapse of the ISA is somewhat arbitrary: I use May 1982 when
the sugar price fell beneath the floor of the target range.
26Did these agreements also stabilize prices?  The comparison of the stabilization and post-
stabilization  experience  is more mixed  here.  Looking at the  three year  period  immediately
following the lapse or collapse of stabilization in relation to the three year period terminating
one year prior  to this,  the coefficient of variation of coffee prices fell from 23.6%  to  10.7%.
Coffee moved from a regime  of relatively high but  volatile prices to one of  stable depressed
prices.  By contrast,  the coefficients of variation of cocoa and tin rose respectively from 6.9%
to  14.3% and 8.2%  to 14.3%.  However,  the rise in variability of the cocoa and tin prices is
entirely accounted for by their lower average price levels - the standard deviations of the prices
are almost identical before and after the end of stabilization.  The sugar price remained highly
volatile both before and after the lapse of the ISA.
Economic theory suggests that commodity prices should be  less variable at low levels
than at high levels (Williams and Wright,  1991; Deaton and Laroque, 1992), and any stabilizing
effects of  intervention may have been offset by the volatility-depressing effects of high  stock
overhangs.  Broadly, therefore, the end of these three agreements has seen substantially reduced
price  levels with price  variability either more or less unchanged, or declining in line with the
lower level of prices.
Evaluation of the overall success of the ICAs is problematic because there has never been
a clear international consensus over whether the objectives of these agreements is the reduction
of price variability or the achievement of higher prices.  We have seen that there is little prima
facie  evidence  of  ICAs  reducing  price  variability.  However,  while  the  rhetoric  of  the
agreements emphasized reduction in price variability,  but producer governments tended to see
this claimed reduction as a means of bringing the consuming countries on board what they hoped
would be a programme  for raising prices.  There is a general consensus that at least the ICoA
did have this effect,  and it seems likely that this is also true of the ITAs.
Downward revision of the price stabilization range brought these tensions into the open
since it posed a  straight choice  between the level  and variability  of prices.  This  tension  is
illustrated by the contrast between tin and rubber: the ITA lacked provisions for the downward
27revisions  of  prices,  with  the  consequence  that  the  ITC  attempted  to  stabilize  about  an
unrealistically high price  level; by contrast,  the INRA forced the stabilization range to follow
the price down with the result that, in maintaining a price only slightly above the effective floor
of the LTAP, the INRO had very little stabilizing effect.  This conflict goes to the heart of any
buffer  stock stabilization exercise.  Since there is no reason to suppose that private  storage is
inadequate,  the use of public sector stocks to  "stabilize" prices about the long run competitive
level  will  never  do  more than displace  an equivalent  level  of private  stocks.  Buffer  stock
stabilization will therefore either be ineffective (the INRA) or distortionary (the ITA).
These  arguments  do  not  apply  to  the  ICoAs  which  relied  on  export  controls.
Furthermore,  it is in coffee that intervention has most obviously raised prices.  The ICoAs did
not include explicit price objectives, and so there was not the opportunity for disagreement about
the stabilization range.  Instead, the ICoAs broke down because of an unevenness and perceived
unfairness of the distribution of the benefits among and within the producing countries; because
consuming countries  were unhappy with the market distortions generated by the operation  of
ICoA  quotas,  and  above all,  because Brazil,  always central to  the  operation  of  the ICoAs,
became  ambivalent  about the benefits  of control.  The coffee  industry  was becoming  more
competitive,  not  least within the producing  countries themselves,  and,  in  particular,  Brazil.
These changes gave rise to a constituency within the producing countries who were concerned
less with the level of coffee prices than with the controls and taxes associated  with the ICoA
regime.  Hence, even when an agreement achieved both the objectives of higher and more stable
prices, the means by which these objectives were obtained ceased to be acceptable.
4.  Producer Action
4.1  History
A  standard  response  by  producers  to  weak  market  conditions  has  been  to  combine
together to  limit either production or sales.  Action of this sort is clearly anti-competitive but
governments  have often been willing to tolerate or even encourage these combinations on the
28argument that the public interest is better served by the continued availability of the capital stock
and maintenance of employment than by allowing consumers the temporary  benefit of prices
below long run costs.  At the same time, governments have been anxious to ensure  that these
arrangements do not continue once markets recover.  In practice, collusion is easier to maintain
in  weak  market  conditions since potential entrants  are also likely  to  be discouraged  by  low
potential profits.
These arguments apply to a wide range of industries but they have always been acute in
the primary  sector because of the very long lead times in investment.  This applies in mining
(a new mine will typically take between seven and ten years to reach production while extensions
to an existing mine may take three to five years) and in tree crops (trees will require  at least
three to five years growth before becoming productive).  In these industries excess capacity can
persist  for  periods  which  are  significantly longer  than  those  associated  with  the  industrial
business cycle.  It is arguable that general over-capacity of this sort may have been responsible
for the low level of real commodity prices experienced over the late eighties and early nineties.
In this context,  it is perhaps natural for primary commodity producers to respond to thie
lack of  international action to stabilize prices by attempting to do so unilaterally,  often within
associations of producing countries.  Indeed, in so doing, producers are in effect coming round
full  circle,  in  that  the  impetus  behind  the  first  postuar  ICAs  was  to  provide  consumer
representation,  and thereby international sanction, for similar producer arrangements which had
existed in the interwar period.  More recently, OPEC provided a possible model for action of
this sort, the first INRA in 1979 was preceded by a producer agreement within the ANRPC, and
many of the same countries joined together in 1986 after the collapse of the 6th ITA to form the
Association of Tin Producing Countries (the ATPC).
There  is little evidence that either the ANRPC nor the ATPC had any significant effect
on price levels.  In much the same spirit, coffee producers responded in 1993 to the continuing
low levels of coffee prices by initiating a retention scheme and, at the same time,  in aluminum,
where  there has never been an ICA, the major producing companies joined together  to sign a
29Memorandum of  Understanding (the MoU)  in relation to restrictions  in supply.  It is widely
believed that these two arrangements have had some effect on price levels.  At the same time,
the 5th ICCA,  which lacks clauses which would permit active market intervention, has a brief
to organize  withholding arrangements of a similar sort.
4.2  The 1993 Coffee Retention Scheme
The breakdown of coffee market intervention in 1989 was followed by prices 40% lower
than those preceding the breakdown.  Furthermore,  by the summer of  1993 it was becoming
increasingly difficult  to believe that this period of  low prices would  be quite  temporary.  It
seems  probable  that  the  continuing  low  level  of  prices  resulted  from  producing  countries
attempting  to  maintain export  revenues by  exporting  stocks  accumulated during  the  control
period, and that in the context of unexciting demand growth, consumers could only be persuaded
to hold these stocks by prices significantly beneath long term sustainable levels.  The short run
supply elasticity  in coffee is low since harvesting costs are typically small in relation to total
costs, and  1993 was the first year in which there is evidence of a decline in production  as the
effects of low replanting levels and less active maintenance begin to show.
The impetus towards a new arrangement to bolster coffee prices came jointly  from the
Central American producers.  It may have been reinforced by the negotiation of the 5th ICO,
which came into effect in October 1994, but which lacked any market intervention instruments.
Brazil  and Colombia  suggested the establishment of  a floor price  beneath which  they would
commit themselves not to sell, but this rapidly transformed itself into a proposal for withholding
stocks.  At a July 1993 meeting in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Colombia and Guatemala,  agreed on
a scheme to withhold 20% of scheduled shipments, and at a meeting in Kampala in August, the
African coffee producers agreed to join the scheme.  The full 20% withholding would take place
so long as the ICO indicator price remained beneath 75 C/lb, dropping to  10% for prices within
the range 75-80 C/lb. A price above 85 C/lb would trigger release.  The relative modesty of this
proposal may be seen by comparing these prices with the ICoA quota trigger ranges of 110 C/lb
and  150 C/lb - see  Figure  3.  The plan was finalized at a meeting in Brasilia  in  September
30although the target price  ranges agree at that meeting were not officially announced.  By this
stage,  the arrangement  was agreed  by  all major producing  countries  including Indonesia,  a
country which had earlier been most sceptical in relation to the possibility of price support.  This
wide level of acceptance assured doubters that the domestic costs of withholding exports would
be  covered  by  the  additional  revenues  raised  on  the  80%  or  production  exported  through
enhanced prices.
The coffee  producers  also  agreed  to  form  a  new  organization,  to  be  known  as  the
Association of Coffee-Producing Countries (the ACPC).  It is intended that eventually the coffee
retention programme,  in abeyance at the end of 1994 because of high prices, will be managed
by the ACPC in place of the current ad hoc Coffee Retention Committee (CRC).  Negotiations
to  create  the  ACPC  started  in  February  1993 but  it  was the  failure  in  May  1993  of  the
negotiations for the 5th ICoA, which became operational in October 1994, to agree the continued
use of export controls which essentially stimulated the producing countries to look instead to the
ACPC.  The initial impetus towards its foundation came from Brazil, Colombia and the central
American  producers,  but  African producers  were also sympathetic.  At the end  of  1994, the
agreement to create the ACPC has been ratified by insufficiently many producing countries to
bring the organization into formal existence but this appears to reflect tight legislative timetables
rather than reluctance.  Article 30 of the 1994 ICoA permits the ICC to "examine the possibility
of negotiating a new International Coffee Agreement which could contain measures designed to
balance the supply and demand for coffee" (ICO,  1994).  It would not be  too far-fetched to
regard the ACPC as the producer side of the ICO sidestepping the lack of intervention provisions
in the 5th ICoA and awaiting this  "new" agreement.
The expectation of  the retention scheme had an immediate effect on  the coffee price
which rose from a first quarter average of 65.4 C/lb to reach 73.5 C/lb in the final quarter, a rise
of 12%.  Furthermore,  the coffee market was becoming tighter even disregarding the effects of
the withholding  arrangement  as  demand  growth  picked up  with  the result  that  the upward
movement in the coffee price continued in the first five months of 1994 with the result that it
had effectively doubled over the year to May 1994.  This resulted in the release of the withheld
31stocks in two tranches, the first in May and the second in July  1994.
The coffee  market is always vulnerable to adverse weather  conditions in the southern
Brazilian states of Minas Gerais (now the coffee producing state), Parana and Sao Paulo.  The
severe frost  in  1975 caused the boom prices of  1976-78, and drought  conditions  in  1985-86
resulted in the high prices of 1986.  It is remarkable that the (southern hemisphere) winter of
1994 saw two severe frosts together with low rainfall in this same area which together generated
a jump in the coffee price during June and July 1994 giving an overall fivefold increase over the
year.
Evaluation of the impact of the coffee retention scheme is difficult since it is clear  that
the largest part of the increase in price was caused by the very tight market conditions resulting
from  the shortfall  in the Brazilian crop  against the background of  stronger  demand growth.
Indeed,  since the major effect of the retention scheme was simply to  delay exports,  it seems
unlikely that prices could have been affected by the scheme after the mid-year when the retained
stocks  were  released.  In  Figure  6,  I  plot the  ICO  CIP against  the World  Bank  index  of
agricultural  food prices with the ratio normalized at  100 in June  1993, the month before the
initial Rio  meeting.  This  plot  suggests a  significant effect  from  the  announcement  of  the
scheme, perhaps  giving rise to a 20% rise in the price in the autumn of  1993,21  but  with the
ratio back to near its June level in the first quarter of  1994, as the prices of other agricultural
food products benefited from tighter markets resulting from rapid demand growth.  The largest
claim that can be made is therefore that the coffee retention scheme resulted in the coffee price
rising  some months earlier than would otherwise have been the case.
21  This figure slightly underestimates the extent of the relative rise in coffee prices since the
comparator  index has a coffee content.  There is however some suggestion of an element of
options-related manipulation in the London September coffee contract which may make the peak
price during that month unrepresentative of market conditions.  Sources: agricultural foods index
- Commodity Policy and Analysis Unit, International Trade Division, World Bank, Washington
DC; ICO CIP - ICO, Monthly Report on Prices, various issues.
324.3  The 1994 Aluminum Memorandum of Understanding
The aluminum industry has never been the subject of international control,  and indeed
it  was  not  on  UNCTAD's  list  of  core  commodities.  This  reflects  the  fact  that  it  is
predominantly a developed country commodity, because although bauxite is mined in developing
countries,  the value added in the industry is largely at the smelting stage and this tends to be
located  principally  where  relatively  inexpensive  electricity  (generally  hydroelectricity)  is
available.  Until the end of the nineteen seventies, the aluminum industry was effectively under
the control of the major producing companies who set relatively stable producer prices, so that
there is a history of something approaching regulation.
The  structure  of the industrv  has changed dramatically over  the past decade,  in part
because of a  decrease  in concentradion andi in part because  of the successful introduction of
futures trading  (in 1978) on the LME - see Haskel and Powell (1994).  The refined aluminum
price  is now as  variable as the prices of other traded commodities (Slade,  1991).  Of even
greater concern to the industry,  however,  was the fact that prices fell to very low levels over
the five year period  1989-93.  Initially, this was the effect of industrial recession, and the fall
in price was of the sam.e  ordier as that in other non-ferrous metals.  However, from  1991 these
already low prices were exacerbated by a massive increase in exports of refined aluminum from
the ex-Soviet Union, largely the Russian Federation.  Reported figures indicate a jump in exports
from the former Soviet Union from  274,000 tons in  1990 to  1,521,000 tons in  1993.22 The
1993 is equivalent to 10% of "western world" 23 consumption of aluminum.  The rise in Russian
exports arose from the coincidence of the collapse of demand from traditional (largely defence
oriented)  users  of aluminum  in the former  Soviet Union  in conjunction with  relatively  low
22  World Bureau of Metal Statistics: World Metal Statistics Yearbook 1994.  Actual exports
in  1993 may have been significantly in excess of this reported  figure.  Tons are metric tons.
Nickel also experienced a large rise in exports from the ex-Soviet Union.
23  i.e.  excluding  ex-COMECON  countries  and  China,  for  which  historical  data  are
unreliable.
33internal  energy  prices  and  an  acute  shortage  of  foreign currency.  In  the context  of  static
demand, these exports were largely absorbed into stocks held principally on the LME, and these
high stock levels transmit directly into a low real price.
The initial reaction of many producers was to wonder whether Russian exports could be
limited under  anti-dumping legislation.  This  campaign was led by the European Aluminium
Association who in November 1993 persuaded the EU to negotiate a voluntary export restriction
scheme  with  Russia.  Irrespective  of  the merits  of  the  argument  that  the  metal  was being
dumped, the proposal was unlikely ever to be effective since, in a world market, it is irrelevant
where the Russian aluminum was sold - restriction of sales in Europe would merely divert the
aluminum to Japan or North America.  Indeed, it was that fear which forced the North American
producers  to  consider  action  on  their  own part.  Initial  talks  were  held  in  Washington  in
December  with  a  subsequent round  in  Brussels  in  January.  US  producers  were  seriously
constrained by fears of violating anti-trust legislation and so at a formal level these talks were
conducted  by government  representatives.  As  a consequence the MoU  has merely  advisory
status with regard to private  sector companies.  In practice,  it is difficult to believe that  the
initiative was not taken by the companies themselves, although this may be tested in the courts.
The Russians took the position at these talks that cuts in production should be equitable
across all producers,  and that they should not be singled out for larger cuts simply because,  in
terms  of western  markets,  they were  a new producer.  The European  and  North  American
producers realised  that this was the only basis for an agreement, and a draft Memorandum  of
Understanding  (the MoU)  was produced by the EU Commission to this effect.  The Russian
aluminum producers  agreed to cut production by 300,000 tons per year (9%), rising to 500,00
tons per  year (15%),  while western producers were  "expected" to follow with cuts of 1.5-2m
tons  per  year  (10-13%),  although no  precise  figures  were  given  in  this  regard  because of
concerns on the part of US producers relating to anti-trust legislation.  The signing of the draft
MoU also allowed the EU controls on imports of Russian aluminum to lapse.  The draft MoU
was formalized at a further meeting in Ottawa in the first days of March.
34The  aluminum price  started  to  rise  in  December  1993,  and  it seems  likely  that  the
prospect of  an agreement to limit production was one factor behind this rise.  However,  the
prices of the other non-ferrous metals also started to rise at the same time,  and there were no
special factors in these industries.  Metals prices have boomed in 1994 and these relatively high
prices look likely to be sustained into 1995.  The major factor behind the metals price  rises in
general has been a surge in consumption growth, the question in regard to the MoU is whether
there has been any differential price rise in aluminum relative to other metals.
The situation in aluminum is in some respects similar to that in coffee: in both industries
an intervention scheme was negotiated just prior  to  an upturn  in the price  which would have
taken  place  regardless  of  the  agreement,  although  in  neither  case  could  this  have  been
anticipated.  It would therefore be  quite wrong to attribute either the price rise  wholly to the
agreement.  I have suggested that the coffee retention scheme is likely to have brought part of
the price rises forward in time, but that it probably had little effect on price  levels from June
1994 onwards  since there  is neither  production levels nor subsequent stock levels have been
affected.  In aluminum, by contrast,  the MoU was intended to cut both production  and stock
levels.  The question,  therefore,  is  whether there  has been any  such cut.  Current  data are
insufficient to  allow a  firm conclusion,  but  preliminary figures  show  1994 "western  world"
refined aluminum production at 14.4m tons against 15.1  m tons for 1993.  This is a substantial
fall which has reduced production to  1989 levels.  The largest part of the fall is attributable to
the USA, down from 3.7m tons to 3.3m tons. 24 By contrast, Russian production is ambiguous
but  preliminary  evidence suggests that the agreed  cuts have failed  to materialize.25  Against
this,  it is widely held that production in Russia would have further increased in the absence of
the MoU as the result of new capacity becoming available.
24  World Metal Statistics Yearbook, 1995 (World Bureau of Metal Statistics, Ware, Herts.).
25  Metal Bulletin,  25 July 1994.
35In Figure  7, I plot the ratio of the (dollar) aluminum price to the prices of respectively
copper, lead, nickel and zinc over the period July 1993 to May 1995. normalized so that in each
case the average for the three months September-November  1993 (i.e. just  before the start of
the price rise) is equal to 100.  This graph shows that the behaviour of the aluminum price over
1994 and the first part of 1995 was remarkably similar to that of copper, lead and nickel but that
the zinc price has fallen relative to other non-ferrous metals prices.  This comparison suggests
that, if special factors are to be invoked, these are required to explain why the zinc price has
failed to share in the  1994 non-ferrous metals price surge rather than to explain any particular
feature of the aluminum history.
This  conclusion contrasts strongly with the dominant view  in the aluminium industry
which attributes a significant effect to the MoU.  Aluminum analysts tend to point to the high
level of aluminum stocks relative to those in copper - total commercial stocks amounted to 3.6
months consumption at the end of 1993 compared with  1.8 months in copper.  However,  the
level of aluminum stocks is comparable with those in nickel (4.2 months consumption) so it is
not clear  that these stock levels would have resulted in depressed price growth  in the absence
of the MoU.  In general, the effect of high stocks should primarily be seen in the level of prices,
rather than in the response of prices to a shock, and it is true that the aluminium price remained
beneath estimated long run production costs for most of 1994.26 It is also true that  "western
world" production of aluminum fell by 4.4% in 1994 from its 1993 level, and this may be taken
as indicative of the effects of the MoU.  At the same time, refined copper production (on the
same  basis)  fell  by  2.1%.27  It  is  unclear  how  what  proportion  of  the  fall  in  aluminum
production can be attributed to the MoU rather than simply to closure of expensive capacity.
26  Econometric analysis suggests that demand shocks will typically have a much larger effect
on aluminum prices than supply shocks, essentially because demand shocks are sustained over
time while supply shocks have an effect which decays relatively rapidly.  Focusing solely on the
supply-demand  balance,  which  gives  equal  weight  to  supply  and  demand  shocks,  may  be
misleading - see Gilbert (1995).  For data sources see footnote 24.
27  World Bureau of Metal Statistics, World Metal Statistics, June 1995 (Ware, Herts.).
36It is therefore  somewhat more difficult to reach a clear conclusion on the effectiveness
of the aluminum MoU  than it was with the coffee retention scheme.  The rise  in aluminum
prices over  1994-95 is not out of line with the price rises in comparable metals,  but there has
been a sharp fall in production levels against a background of a continuing high  stock level.
Russia has not obviously kept to its MoU commitments.  The overall effect of the MoU has been
to allow  a  shift  in the location of production to  Russia with  the result that Russia  has now
become an integrated part of the world aluminum market.  This has required western companies
to  reduce  their  production  levels  to accommodate the Russians.  The MoU  has provided  a
framework within which these reductions have taken place so that no single company has borne
a  disproportionate  burden.  Despite this,  the  largest  reductions  have  taken  place  in  north
America.
4.4  The 5th International Cocoa Agreement
The 5th ICCA differs from the previous four ICCAs  in that reliance on a buffer  stock
has been discontinued.  As noted, the ICCO buffer stock has never been effective in stabilizing
the cocoa price, both because of lack of funds and because of an at times inappropriately defined
stabilization range.  Instead, the new ICCA places relianice on supply management.  The crucial
article (29.1) states
"In order to deal with the problem of market imbalances in the medium and long term,
and  in  particular  the  problem  of  structural  overproduction,  the  exporting  Members
undertake to abide by a production-management designed to achieve a lasting equilibrium
between  world  production  and  consumption.  The  plan  shall be  drawn  up  by  the
producing countries in a Production Committee set up for this purpose by the Council."
(United Nations,  1993).
Pursuant to this objective, the ICCO met in June and then againi in September 1994 when they
agreed to cut production by 75,000 tons per  year (3 %) over the five years  starting with crop
year 1994-95.  Although this cost appears modest, it is in the context of overall balance between
37production  and consumption,  with high but declining  stock levels. It was notable  that Indonesia,
estimated to be the third largest producer in 1993-94, declined to commit to this agreement.
News of the proposed cuts had no noticeable  effect on market prices.
The cocoa supply  management  scheme  appears  similar to the aluminum  MoU but within
the framework of an ICA.  This reflects the fact that in tropical products, small and moderate
sized producers are  typically represented by governments, whereas in metals transnational
companies  tend to dominate. However, the scheme  does appear fundamentally  misconceived  in
two respects. First, the management  of production  is difficult in tree crop commodities  because
the marginal costs of harvesting fruit are typically  small.  It is for this reason that the ICoAs,
and their continuation  in the coffee  retention scheme, have always  envisaged  control of exports
rather than production. Second, the agreement  is based on the premise that there can be a long
term imbalance  between  production  and consumption  that the price mechanism  will not correct.
It is true that in this as in other tree crop and metals industries, excess capacity can
persist over periods of up to perhaps five to seven  years because  of the long lead times involved
in investment,  and the long life of trees. However, low prices will result in low investment  and
over time this will result in prices returning towards long run production costs.  This broadly
appears to  have happened over the nineteen eighties, with the substantial excess capacity
resulting from expansion  in the CMte  d'Ivoire now having been worked off.  It is possible that
an element of supply management, if feasible, could have been helpful over this period, but
there appears little merit in the proposal in current market conditions.  The long period of
relatively low prices in the cocoa industry  may have conditioned  producers into believing  there
is something  inevitable  in this situation  (contrast  similar  views in the thirties and the immediate
postwar years), but if so, the 5th ICCA appears to be addressed  to a problem which is already
in the past.
384.5  Assessment
There has been a long history in the primary industries of official or semi-official cartel
action  in the face  of weak prices.28  In the postwar  period these schemes tended  to become
more formal and were typically enacted under United Nations auspices.  These developments
culminated in the UNCTAD Integrated Programme for Commodities (IPC) which attempted to
set up  intervention schemes across the broad  range of internationally  traded commodities  of
particular importance to developing countries.  With the lapse of this initiative, producers  have
tended to be attracted by supply management or stock withholding schemes more along the lines
of the pre-ICA period,  and a number of such schemes have been negotiated either  within (the
5th ICCA) or outside (the coffee retention scheme, the aluminum MoU) the framework of an
ICA.  However,  it is difficult to see strong evidence of any of these schemes having had any
more than a short term impact on prices.
I have noted that in both metals and tree crop industries, imbalances between the level
of demand and that of productive capacity can persist over uncomfortably long periods of time,
and,  when these take the form of over-capacity,  this can lead to  long periods of  low prices.
Supply  management  and  stock  withholding  provide  feasible  means  of  responding  to  these
situations.  Provided the schemes are only intended to be temporary,  entry is unlikely to be a
serious problem  since potential entrants are likely to prefer  to await price recovery.  In one
sense, this objective of the avoidance of very low prices was the original motivation of the ICA
movement before this became subsumed under the more general but less attainable objective of
price stabilization.  It is arguable, therefore,  that this refocusing is welcome.
Nevertheless,  schemes  of  the  sort  described  in  this  section  are  cartels,  and  their
embodiment in the form of an ICA makes them internationally sanctioned cartels.  Developed
country governments remain ambiguous in this regard with the EU generally favorable but the
USA hostile.  The USA signalled its displeasure at the coffee retention scheme and the formation
28  See Rowe (1965) for an account of the interwar period.
39of the ACPC by withdrawing from the ICO, with a US official quoted as stating "opposition to
unilateral  producer  action,  formed  outside international commodity  agreements,  remains  the
official US  stance" (Financial Times, 28 September  1993).  Similarly the aluminum MoU  is
under  investigation  by  the  Department  of  Justice  as  a  possible  infringement  of  anti-trust
29 legislation.
5.  Conclusions
Commodity agreements fit uneasily in a world in which markets are becoming globalized
and increasingly competitive.  Development policy, both as preached by international agencies
and practised  by  typically democratically elected and non-socialist governments  in the major
producing countries, emphasizes productive efficiency, product quality and effective marketing.
This is a long way from the ideology which gave central place to supply restrictions operating
through centralized marketing boards and quota allocations.  In this less centralized and more
competitive  world,  the  winners  and  losers  from  commodity  stabilization  are  more  evenly
distributed across the producing and consuming countries.  Commodity policy  is no longer a
matter or redistribution from consumers to producers.
This institutional evolution has been reinforced by the widespread belief,  evidenced by
the  tin collapse,  that  commodity  market  stabilization cannot  succeed.  However,  no  other
commodity agreement has collapsed.  Rather, they have lapsed.  In sugar,  this was because of
adverse market conditions which many attempt at stabilization impractical.  In cocoa, there was
never  sufficient  support  for  stabilization for  the  authority  to  have  the  funds  to  intervene
effectively in a market which in any case moved from a chronic state of deficient capacity in the
nineteen seventies to chronic  excess capacity in the latter half of the eighties.  In the coffee
market,  stabilization was effective both in raising prices and containing their  variability,  but
intervention lapsed because of disagreement over the division of the benefits between countries,
and because the effects of high prices were often not experienced by producers themselves.  By
29  The USA is not a member of the 5th ICCA and was not involved in its negotiation.
40contrast,  the natural  rubber agreement soldiers on but only by intervening at such a low level
as to cause little enthusiasm in producers and little resentment in consumers.
Although  there  are  no  easy  generalizations,  there  is  a  persistent  theme.  In  earlier
decades,  the  belief  that  stabilization  could  and  would  collectively  improve  the position  of
commodity producers provided the impetus for resolution of at least some of the problems that
actual intervention threw up.  Since the tin collapse in 1985, the converse belief has undermined
the willingness of producers to look for resolutions of difficulties within existing ICAs and has
reinforced  the suspicions  of consumer  governments that  these agreements were  in  no-one's
interests.  In any case, interventions of this sort rest uneasily in the current climate  in which
competitive  markets  are  encouraged  and  state  interventions  are  seen  as  requiring  clear
justification  in terms of market  failure.  The existence of active futures markets  in all of the
industries  which  have  seen  commodity  agreements  makes  justification  along  these  lines
problematic.
Nevertheless,  the  "commodity problem"  has not  disappeared.  Primary  industries are
prone to experience long periods in which the price remains below long run costs and this can
result in severe hardship to producers,  and also in many cases,  to their governments.  When
developed  country  industries  (e.g.  steel and  shipbuilding) experience  problems  of  this  sort,
governments  generally  offer  some  form  of  assistance,  justified  either  by  distributional
considerations,  or through the desire to avoid substantial labour market adjustment costs.  The
same sorts of arguments may in principle be applied at an international level in primary markets,
and this motivates producers to look for mechanisms to raise prices from often very low levels
in industries experiencing excess capacity.  If these are not offered within the framework of an
international commodity agreement, producers may seek to attain the same objectives unilaterally
through a producers association.  Schemes of this sort have been implemented in 1993 and 1994
in the coffee and aluminum industries outside the confines of an ICA; and are being discussed
within the 5th ICCA.
41It  is possible  that  such schemes  may generate  major  benefits  to  producers,  but  the
evidence suggests  that the  coffee retnetion  scheme  has had  relatively  small and  short-lived
effects,  while  the  effects  of  the  aluminum  MoU  have  primarily  been  on  the  location  of
production rather than on price levels.  This reflects the fact that both schemes were introduced
just  prior  to the 1994 commodity boom, and in other circumstances the effects might be more
dramatic.  If commodity prices do fall back to the very low real levels experienced during  1990-
93 it is likely that schemes of this sort will move up the international agenda,  particularly  in
those industries where there  is a history either of international control (as in coffee) or where
concentration  has been sufficient to give large firms a dominant  role in setting prices  (as in
aluminum).  These developments will force developed country governments to decide whether
they prefer to  see markets controlled by producer cartels where they will lack representation,
or under the auspices of international agreements.
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45Table 1: General Features  of ICAs
Cocoa  Coffee  Rubber  Sugar  Tin
First agreement  1972  1962  1980  1954  1954
Current/final agreement  4th'  4th*  3rd  4th  6th
date  1987  1983  1996  1978  1982
US membership  no  yes*  uncertain'  yes  no
Breakdown/lapse  of
economic  clauses  suspended suspended  continues  lapsed  collapsed
date  1988  1989  1983  1985
Buffer stock  yes  no  yes  no  yes
ceiling  + 23.1%  n.a.  + 28.6%  n.a.  +  15%
floor  - 23.1%  n.a.  - 25.2%  n.a.  - 15%
must sell/buy  ±  18.2%  n.a.  ± 20%  n.a.  ±  15%
may sell/buy  ±  18.2%  n.a.  ± 15%  n.a.  ±  5%
Export controls  no  yes  no  yes  yes
Withholding  provisions  yes  no  no  no  no
implemented  no  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.
*  The 5th ICCA and the 5th ICoA, which  both came into force in 1994, lack buffer stock
and export control provisions. The 5th ICCA has withholding  provisions. The USA was
a member  of the 4th ICoA and the 2nd INRA but did not join the 5th ICoA.  Its attitude
to the 3rd INRA has yet to be detennined. Buffer stock trigger prices are relative to the
(actual or implicit)  central reference price.
Note: no data
46Table  2:  Post-ICA  Price  Changes
Years  Cocoa  Coffee  Sugar  Tin
-1  100.0  100.0  100.0  100.0
0  64.7  66.3  54.9  61.2
1  52.4  69.0  63.5  57.3
2  59.0  60.2  33.8  50.2
3  57.0  56.0  42.1  59.7
4  53.4  75.3  56.2  49.1
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Figure 1: The Tin Price and the World Bank Metals and Minerals Price Index (1970=100)
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Figure 2: ICCO Indicator Price (SDR/lb) and Support Ranges
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Source: World Metal Statistics Yearbook, 1995.
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List of Abbreviations
ACPC  Association of Coffee-Producing Countries
ANRPC  Association of Natural Rubber Producing Countries
ATPC  Association of Tin Producing Countries
BSM  Buffer Stock Manager
CAP  Common Agricultural Policy (EC)
CIP  1979 Composite Indicator Price (ICoA)
CRC  Coffee Retention Committee
DMIP  Daily Market Indicator Price (INRO)
EU  European Union (previously European Community)
IBC  Instituto Brasileiro do Cafe
ICA  International Commodity Agreement
ICC  International Coffee Council
ICCA  International Cocoa Agreement
ICCO  International Cocoa Organization
ICO  International Coffee Organization
ICoA  International Coffee Agreement
INRA  International Natural Rubber Agreement
IPC  Integrated Programme for Commodities (UNCTAD)
ISA  International Sugar Agreement
ISO  International Sugar Organization
ITA  International Tin Agreement
ITC  International Tin Council
LIP  Lower Intervention Price (INRO)
LME  London Metal Exchange
LTAP  Lower Trigger Action Price (INRO)
MoU  Memorandum of Understanding (aluminum)
MS c/kg  Malaysian-Singapore cents/kilogram  (INRO)
NIEO  New International Economic Order
OPEC  Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PANCAFE  Productores de Cafe S.A.
SDR  Special Drawing Right
UIP  Upper Intervention Price (INRO)
UNCTAD  United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
UTAP  Upper Trigger Action Price (INRO)
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